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Different versions of complex, simple, and running tests of immediate memory 
span were compared in their ability to predict fluid intelligence (gF).  Conditions across 
memory tasks differed in terms of whether or not a secondary cognitive task was 
interleaved between to-be-remembered items (complex versus other span tasks), whether 
or not more items were presented than were ultimately to-be-remembered (running versus 
other span tasks), and whether presentation rate was relatively fast or slow (running and 
simple span tasks).  Regressions indicated that up to 42.6% of variance in general fluid 
gF was explained by the memory span measures entered in different combinations.  
Across comparisons, shared relationships among span tasks accounted for a plurality of 
total variance in gF.   Results indicate that in spite of procedural differences and resulting 
intra-individual variance in memory performance, the present memory tasks captured 
largely the same inter-individual variance in working memory capacity, insofar as this is 






 I set out to answer the basic question “does a memory span task need to have a 
secondary task interleaved between to-be-remembered items in order to be a good 
measure of working memory capacity?”  The question reduces to “do complex span tasks 
uniquely tap the important dimensions of working memory?”  For most of the past three 
decades, there has been general agreement in the affirmative (see Unsworth & Engle, 
2007a,b).  However, recent work has suggested that working memory capacity, insofar as 
it is important for complex cognition, can also be measured well by a simple memory 
span task (Colom, Rebollo, Abad, & Shih, 2006; Kane, Hambrick, Tuholski, Wilhelm, 
Payne, & Engle, 2004; Unsworth & Engle, 2007a,b; 2006a).  It is clear that the secondary 
task procedure of complex span tasks affects immediate memory performance.  It is 
plausible, however, that this does not mean that complex span tasks uniquely capture 
inter-individual variance in such things as simultaneous storage-and-processing 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) or executive attention (Engle, 2002).  It could be that such 
abilities are also reflected in performance on memory paradigms lacking this procedure.  
I used complex and simple span tasks much as others have done before to examine this 
question (e.g., Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004; LaPointe & Engle, 1990; Unsworth 
& Engle, 2007a,b; 2006a).  Complex and simple span tasks were used to predict 
individual differences in general fluid intelligence (gF).  I extended this line of research 
to include a third kind of memory span task, running memory span (Pollack, Johnson, & 
Knaff, 1959).  Running span tasks do not include a secondary task, but like complex span 
 2
tasks, running span tasks have been proposed to uniquely tap into executive cognitive 
functions by virtue of a special procedure, i.e., presenting more items than can be, or are 
instructed to be, remembered.   
I assessed the amount of predicted variance in gF that was due to unique 
relationships with each span task and the amount that was due to common relationships 
among the set of span tasks.  The question was whether one or more of the span tasks 
would uniquely predict substantial amounts of gF variance, at the expense of shared 
prediction.  If complex span tasks require executive control processes over and above 
simple or running span tasks, then they should account for variance in gF over and above.  
The same may be predicted for the running span task.  Alternatively, an experiment might 
show that what is common to the span tasks requires sufficient executive control of 
working memory, i.e., they all tap the same basic cognitive processes.  In this case, 
variance shared among span tasks would account for the most variance in higher-order 
cognition. 
 
Complex and simple memory span  
Simple span tasks are tests of immediate memory in which a person is exposed to 
short lists of items and then must report the items in order when the list ends.  Complex 
span tasks include the same serial order memory requirement, but in between 
presentations of the to-be-remembered items the participant must perform a secondary 
task such as solving a math equation (Operation Span) or judging a sentence (Reading 
Span).  These so-called storage-and-processing tasks were developed to tap the construct 
of a dynamic working memory system (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Daneman & Carpenter, 
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1980), better than simple storage-only memory tests, thought to reflect a more static 
short-term memory buffer (Turner & Engle, 1989). 
For almost three decades investigators of individual differences in working 
memory capacity (WMC) have shown that complex span tests are consistently predictive 
of higher order cognition (for reviews see Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Unsworth 
and Engle, 2007a).  In one influential study, Engle et al. (1999) demonstrated that the 
variance unique to complex spans (after controlling for simple spans) predicted gF, but 
the variance shared between the two measures did not.  Such findings have stimulated a 
range of theories of individual differences in WMC, holding in common the view that 
special and unique properties are conferred on complex span tasks by virtue of including 
a moderately demanding secondary task in the procedure.  Additionally, a great deal of 
work has been devoted to investigating aspects of the secondary task, such as content 
domain, its relationship to specialized skills, or its similarity to the to-be-remembered 
items.       
Recent work has called into question the basic assumption underlying much of 
this work, namely that working memory is uniquely measured by complex span tasks of 
the storage-and-processing type, and that other memory paradigms tap some other 
memory system or function altogether, such as episodic memory or short-term storage.  
For example, Unsworth and Engle (2007a,b; 2006a) demonstrated that performance on 
complex and simple spans is affected similarly by experimental manipulations and that 
simple spans can be just as good at predicting gF (if variance from longer lists is used).  
Indeed Unsworth and Engle (2007b) have recently shown, in part by reanalyzing Engle et 
al.’s (1999) data, that in fact it is the variance shared between the two span tests that 
 4
accounts for the most variance in gF, not variance unique to the complex span tests as 
hitherto believed (see also Colom, Rebollo, Abad, & Shih, 2006).  Additionally, WMC 
measured by complex span shows close relationships with performance in a wide variety 
of other memory paradigms, including those that seem to heavily involve retrieval from 
longer-term memory such as immediate, delayed, and continuous distractor free recall; 
(Unsworth, 2007; Unsworth and Engle, 2007a) or the letter fluency task (Rosen & Engle, 
1997).  Cantor and Engle (1993) showed that increased response times due to fan 
interference (Anderson, 1974) provided the same information as complex span 
performance did concerning individual differences in reading comprehension.  WMC-
related differences in proactive interference have already been noted (Kane & Engle, 
2000; Rosen & Engle, 1998).   
Unsworth and Engle (2007a,b) have recently proposed a framework for 
understanding individual differences in WMC that acknowledges separable contributions 
from two system components: An attention-like primary memory, important for 
maintaining representations over short times, and a secondary memory, important for 
recovering information that is continuously lost from primary memory due to interference 
from new input to the system.  In their review of the relevant literature, Unsworth and 
Engle (2007a) classified thirteen situations in which individual differences in WMC have 
been found according to preponderance of demand for either active maintenance in 
primary memory or controlled search of secondary memory.  For example, WMC-related 
differences have been shown in the antisaccade paradigm (Hallett, 1978), where the 
participant’s only job is to look away from, rather than toward, an attention-capturing 
stimulus (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).  
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This effect would seem to reflect individual differences in primary memory, dedicated to 
robustly maintaining task goals in WM.  However, the antisaccade task would seem to 
require little in the way of retrieval from secondary memory.  A similar interpretation can 
be applied to the fact that individuals lower in WMC are more susceptible to interference 
in the Stroop paradigm (Kane & Engle, 2003), where the main role of memory is to 
maintain the instruction to name the color in which a color-word is printed instead of 
reading the word (Stroop, 1935).  In contrast, WMC-related differences in e.g., a Brown-
Peterson paradigm that maximizes proactive interference (Kane & Engle, 2000) could be 
ascribed mainly to cue-driven search of secondary memory and not so much to active 
maintenance in primary memory (Unsworth and Engle, 2007a; Table 4, p 123). 
Notably, of the several research paradigms examined by Unsworth and Engle 
(2007a), only three were supposed to display individual differences in WMC reflecting 
joint contributions from primary and secondary memory, namely, immediate free recall 
and complex and simple span tasks.  Their process account suggested that to-be-
remembered items in complex span tasks were displaced from maintenance in primary 
memory by the interleaved processing task.  This has the consequence that at time of 
memory test, cue-dependent search of secondary memory must support responding.  In 
contrast, there is no secondary task in simple span tasks to displace to-be-remembered 
items from primary memory.  Displacement occurs in simple span tasks when the number 
of to-be-remembered items exceeds the capacity of primary memory (approximately 4 + 
1 items; Cowan, 2001).  Therefore, simple span performance on short, ‘sub-span’ lists 
reflects mostly maintenance in primary memory, but performance on long, ‘supra-span’ 
lists reflects a combination of maintenance and retrieval from secondary memory.  In 
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contrast, complex span performance reflects a combination of primary memory 
maintenance and secondary memory retrieval even on very short lists.  As part of their 
support of this account, Unsworth and Engle (2007a; 2006a) showed that the magnitude 
of correlation between simple span memory and a gF test (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) 
increased as the number of to-be-remembered items increased in the span test.  No such 
pattern was found across complex span list-lengths. 
The first purpose of the present investigation was to extend with new data the 
earlier findings of Unsworth and Engle concerning complex and simple span tests and 
prediction of higher order cognitive abilities.  Two of each kind of span test was used to 
predict individual differences in gF.  Shared and unique contributions to prediction were 
assessed, and list-length effects on prediction were re-examined for the two kinds of span 
task.  I expected to find that both complex and simple span tests (with optimal 
administration and scoring) were strongly related to gF, and that shared relationships 
between span tests would account for most of the gF variance.  I did not make predictions 
as to whether complex span or simple span tasks would correlate more highly with the gF 
tests, or whether one type of span would account for more criterion variance uniquely 
than the other.  Indeed, results were expected to underscore fundamental underlying 
commonalities across simple and complex span tasks rather than surface differences 
between them.  The main comparison pertained to the presence or absence of a secondary 
cognitive task interleaved between to-be-remembered items. 
Running memory span  
The second purpose of the present investigation was to include the running 
memory span task (Pollack, Johnson, & Knaff, 1959) in order to widen the search for 
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commonalities among span tasks.  Running memory span tasks are like simple span (and 
unlike complex span) tasks in that there is no secondary processing task in between to-be-
remembered items.  However, running span tasks are different from both simple and 
complex span tasks in that participants report only a subset of items that were presented.  
For example, a person might be required to report the last four items on each trial, but 
sometimes more than four items (and sometimes exactly four) are presented.  In Waugh’s 
(1960) terminology the target set (the portion of the list to be reported at test) is called the 
recall series and the list that is actually presented is called the exposure series.  When the 
recall series < the exposure series, such trials can be called partial recall trials  (Mukunda 
and Hall, 1992).  When the number of to-be-remembered items = the number of 
presented items, the recall series and exposure series are coincident.  Such trials can be 
called whole recall trials and are in fact isomorphic to simple span trials, except that their 
occurrence within a block is unpredictable. 
Exposure 
Mukunda and Hall also characterized complex span tests as partial recall tests 
because participants are exposed to information (the interleaved task) that they are not 
supposed to remember for later test.  Relative to simple span tests, this seems the 
appropriate classification for complex span tests.  But relative to running span tests, the 
classification of complex span tests as whole or partial recall is more ambiguous.  In 
complex span tests, all of the items that are designated as to-be-remembered items are, in 
fact, later tested for memory.  In running span tests, items presented are only potentially 
in the target set: Ultimately only some of them are mapped to correct responses at time of 
memory testing.   
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The third purpose of the present investigation is to examine individual differences 
in the effect of being exposed to more items distinguished from the effect of having to 
remember more items, in relation to performance on gF tests.  In whole recall tests like 
simple or complex span, list length effects on serial order memory confound two effects 
that are conceptually separable: The effect of having to remember more items and the 
effect of being exposed to more items.  Gates (1916) investigated the exposure effect on 
memory span by presenting items in excess of span.  His results showed that the 
maximum number of items that could be reliably recalled under conventional procedures 
was much higher than the number that could be recalled when ‘supra-span’ lists were 
presented, for all but highest-performing ten per cent of individuals.  Like Gates’ (1916) 
procedure, running span tasks are able to dissociate these two effects bound up in list-
length effects, by including whole and partial recall trials. 
Working memory ‘updating’ 
In recent years a number of investigators have also argued that partial recall trials 
in running span can be used to tap a process of WM ‘updating’ (Morris and Jones, 1990; 
Miyake et al., 2000; Postle, 2003).  Within this conceptual framework, WM updating is a 
kind of executive function that dynamically manipulates short-term memory 
representations in order to keep the target set current as new items are to-be-remembered 
and old items are to-be-forgotten (Friedman et al., 2006; Miyake et al., 2000; Morris and 
Jones, 1990; Postle, 2003).  This task-analysis of running span as an ‘updating’ task has 
some intuitive appeal and fits with increasing interest across disciplines in so-called 
executive functions.  WM updating as measured by the running memory span task has 
been linked to age-related changes in cognition (Chen & Li, 2007; Fisk and Sharp, 2004; 
Van der Linden, Brédart, & Beerten, 1994).  Friedman, Miyake, and colleagues have 
used a running memory task as part of an updating latent factor to explain individual 
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differences across a range of diverse executive functions (Friedman et al., 2006; Miyake 
et al., 2000), extending this to investigations of genetic heritability (Friedman et al., in 
press). Running memory span as updating task has been shown to correlate well with 
complex span tasks (Lehto, 1994; Miyake et al., 2000). 
Focus of attention 
Cowan and his colleagues have also used running memory span tasks to predict 
higher order cognition (Cowan et al., 2005) in children and young adults, but without 
supposing that participants engage and continue an active strategy such as updating.  
They proposed that participants listen passively to the string of items during presentation, 
and attention is applied to residual sensory memory traces when the list terminates and 
the signal to begin recall is given.  Trace-decay is forestalled in this manner, and 
therefore it is possible for more information to be extracted and coded so that a memory 
can be reported.   
The attention-buffer is limited in capacity, imposing a limit on working memory 
capacity (memory span, ‘span of apprehension’, focus of attention, primary memory, 
etc.).  Cowan (2001) marshaled a wide range of evidence and arguments to support 
assigning specific number for this limit (4 + 1 items; Cowan, 2001).  Individual 
differences in the scope and flexibility of attention are reflected in recalling more or 
fewer items from span memory lists, and are responsible for the demonstrated links 
between memory span and higher-order cognition.  Running memory span is among a 
somewhat restricted set of tasks endorsed by Cowan as theoretically acceptable measures 
of WMC or the scope of attention (Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005).  Running span in 
the format used by Cowan and colleagues, like running span in the ‘updating’ format, has 
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shown strong relationships with criterion cognitive abilities, largely due to variance 
shared with complex span tasks (Cowan et al., 2005).    
  There is a range of opinion as to what psychological constructs or processes are 
measured by running span tasks and consequently there is great diversity in procedures in 
terms of seemingly important variables such as rate, modality, stimuli, and list structure.  
Investigators of ‘executive updating’ tend to present items (consonants) visually at rates 
slow enough to support active rehearsal and updating operations on the target set (e.g, 
Postle, 2003).  Lists are often structured so as to permit a distinction between partial and 
whole recall trials (or updating and non-updating trials, respectively).  That is, sometimes 
the recall series = the exposure series (i.e., non-update trials, also serving as ‘catch trials’ 
so that participants do not adopt a strategy of simply ignoring the first item or two on 
every list).  When the recall series < the exposure series (i.e., update trials) it is by 
increments of one, two, …k items so as to be able to estimate the number of ‘updating 
operations’ necessary (Morris and Jones, 1990).  Items are presented at either the 
‘standard’ rate for span tasks (one item per second), or else slower.  Indeed, Postle (2003) 
argued that for active working memory updating to be assumed, items must be presented 
no faster than one item every two seconds. 
In contrast, investigators of the scope of attention present to-be-remembered items 
at rates presumably too fast to support rehearsal or active manipulation of the target 
representations during list exposure.  This procedure also does not typically include any 
whole recall (or ‘catch trials’).  Additionally, presented lists are not incrementally related 
in length to the number of items to be reported at test as in the ‘updating’ approach 
described above.  Rather, all presented lists far exceed the number of items that can be 
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committed to memory after a single exposure, a task feature designed to ‘overload’ WM 
and prevent participants from adopting a strategy of attempting to memorize the entire 
list (Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005). 
Rate 
The basic contrasts between methods employed by those who conceive of the 
running memory paradigm as an updating or focus of attention task coincide with the 
methodology used by Hockey (1973).  Hockey presented auditory digit strings at varying 
rates (one, two, or three items per second) and manipulated instructions between-subjects.  
The passive group was told to “Listen passively to the list as a whole.  Don’t rehearse 
items or groups of items” (p 106).  The active group was told to “Concentrate on the 
items as they arrive, trying to form them into groups of three… rehearse each group of 
three in turn” (p 106).  Hockey’s results showed a crossover interaction such that the 
active instructions group recalled the most items in the slowest task and the fewest items 
in the fastest task.  In contrast, the passive instructions group remembered the most items 
at the fastest rates and the fewest items at the slowest rates.  The running span procedure 
typically used by Friedman, Miyake, and colleagues (Letter Memory; 2000; 2007; 2008) 
correspond closely to the one per second rate and active instructions in Hockey’s (1973) 
studies, except that items in the former are visual letters instead of auditory digits.  
Participants in their task are indeed instructed and trained to rehearse incoming items in 
groups of three (or four, depending on the study).  In contrast, the typical running span 
procedure used by Cowan, Bunting, and colleagues corresponds closely to the passive 
instructions, fast rate condition in Hockey’s (1973) studies.      
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A fourth purpose of the present investigation was to examine rate effects on 
running memory span (as well as simple span) both in terms of memory performance and 
prediction of higher order cognition.  In light of methodological differences between 
running span measures, it is difficult to say whether the criterion variance that is 
accounted for by the different running span tests in previous studies reflects processes 
unique to each, or shared between, the ‘updating’ and ‘focus of attention’ 
implementations of the task.  Bunting, Cowan, & Saults (2006) directly compared 
performance on fast (2 digits per second) and slow running span tasks (1 digit per 
second), and found that more items were recalled during the slow than the fast version.   
Furthermore, serial position functions derived from performance in the slow running span 
were shallower compared to the fast task, suggesting to Bunting et al. that maintenance-
type rehearsal had prevented items from decaying during the slower lists.  However, their 
results shed no light on the question of differential prediction of higher-order abilities as a 
function of rate because no criterion measures relevant to this question were included in 
their study.  I was motivated to begin to address this knowledge gap in the present work.   
I compared performance in a running span task given at a rate that was 
presumably too fast (two items per second) to support effective maintenance-type 
rehearsal or active updating strategies, to performance in a running span given at a rate 
that indeed slow enough (one item per two seconds) to support such processes if 
participants should choose to attempt them (without being explicitly instructed to do so).  
If the two running span tasks account for much the same variance in higher-order 
cognition and shared much the same variance with the gF criteria and other working 
memory tasks, it would be taken as indirect evidence against the ‘updating’ account of 
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performance in the running span.  The simple span tasks were matched in rate to the two 
running span tasks as a source of additional information about rate effects, in a task in 
which no executive updating in the sense described above was hypothesized to occur.  
Summary of issues and aims  
Current investigators use running span tests in two very different formats to 
investigate two theoretically distinct WM constructs.  However, direct evidence is needed 
before I can conclude that the different versions in fact measure altogether different 
psychological processes or system components.  Rate effects, modality effects, and 
exposure effects differ across relevant studies indeterminately.  Given that no cognitive 
task can be regarded as process-pure, it seems plausible instead that performance on fast 
and slow running spans tap a number of shared processes (as well as some that are unique 
to each).  I addressed this question in the present study by looking at whether fast and 
slow running span would differentially predict performance on measures of gF.       
By the same argument, and just as complex and simple spans are strongly related 
to each other and predict higher order cognition similarly (due to process overlap, i.e., 
both tap individual differences in primary capacity and retrieval from secondary 
memory), it is plausible that performance in running span (irrespective of rate, or perhaps 
differentially by rate) will be strongly related to performance in these two different span 
measures (again, due to process overlap).  Furthermore, it is plausible that a great deal of 
variance in higher order cognition will be accounted for by variance shared among all 
three kinds of span task (suggesting that they all tap individual differences in primary 
memory capacity as well as retrieval from secondary memory). 
Based on the work of Unsworth and Engle, I predicted that most of the variance in 
gF accounted for by the three types of span test would be mostly due to shared 
relationships among predictors.  If including a secondary task in a span test elicits 
executive cognitive processes additional to those elicited by span tests lacking such a 
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procedure, then complex span tasks should show unique relationships with higher-order 
cognition over and above relationships shared with simple and running span tasks.  
Likewise for running span, with respect to the partial recall procedure as an index of 
working memory ‘updating’.   
Researchers who use running span to investigate ‘updating’ (eg., Friedman et al., 
2006) and those who use it to investigate the ‘scope of attention’ (Cowan et al., 2005) 
have separately found their tasks to correlate strongly with complex spans, simple spans, 
and higher-order cognition.  It has been suggested that the composition of mental 
processes underlying running memory span performance is sensitive to the rate at which 
to-be-remembered items are presented.  There is asymmetry.  The fast rate is argued to 
limit effective central executive ‘updating’ or rehearsal, so these processes are 
hypothesized to be absent from running span performance at a fast rate.  However, there 
is no reason to suppose that processes available in the fast task are not also available in 
the slow task.  There are two outcomes to consider. 
If the extra cognitive processes allowed by the slow rate of presentation of to-be-
remembered items are especially important for doing well on tests of higher-order 
cognition (e.g., executive functions), then the slow span tasks should show consistent 
unique relationships with gF over and above relationships shared with fast span tasks.  In 
contrast, if the extra processes allowed by the slow rate are not very important for doing 
well on gF tests (e.g., maintenance-type rehearsal), then the slow task should not show 
such unique relationships with gF over and above the fast tasks.   Indeed, insofar as 
maintenance-type rehearsal is argued to ‘contaminate’ a working memory test that allows 
it (e.g., Cowan, 2001), the slow span tasks might even correlate only weakly with gF and 
the complex span tasks.    
I used multiple regression/correlation approaches to try to answer questions about 
the common and unique psychological processes tapped into by several individual span 
tasks.  Given that the span tasks all require the same basic response, serial order memory, 
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it would be reasonable to expect that all will be highly inter-correlated.  Here I must 
outline my approach to deciding how much interpretive weight to give shared and unique 
variance in this situation.  If any of the following outcomes occurred in my results, I 
would take it to suggest that the predictors are not equivalent measures of the same 
underlying working memory capacity, insofar as this capacity is important for higher-
order cognition.  Say two span tasks, X1 and X2, are used to predict gF, Y.  If X1 and X2 
are each correlated with Y but not with each other, then each will account for unique 
variance in Y but will explain little variance in Y due to shared variance.  Such an 
outcome could be taken as evidence that different cognitive operations are tapped by the 
span tasks, and these different processes are separately important for gF.  If X1 is 
correlated with X2 but not with Y, it will act as a suppressor variable, boosting the 
correlation between X2 and Y (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  Obviously again, 
little criterion variance will be explained due to variance shared between X1 and X2.  The 
cases where only one predictor is correlated with the criterion and the predictors are not 
inter-correlated, and where neither task is correlated with the criterion, do not need to be 
considered.  The preceding outcomes would suggest fundamental differences between 
span tests in terms of underlying cognitive processes elicited by different task variables.   
The following outcomes would be taken as evidence suggesting that the span tests 
are basically equivalent as tests of working memory capacity.  Consider the case where 
X1 and X2 are significantly correlated with each other and with Y.  In this case much of 
the criterion variance explained would be due to shared variance between predictors.  But 
there is always a portion of unique variance in regressions, and one of the predictors may 
capture more of that than the other one.  The problem is how much interpretive weight to 
give to the unique versus the shared variance.  Of logical necessity, one of the two 
predictors will be more highly correlated (numerically) with the criterion than the other 
one is.  Since the predictors are highly inter-correlated it can occur that the predictor with 
the higher correlation with Y will uniquely account for criterion variance over and above 
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the shared prediction, and subsume the contribution from the predictor with the lower 
correlation with Y.   
In this case it is largely a matter of judgment (after considering other available 
evidence) to decide whether to emphasize in one’s interpretation the shared relationships 
among predictors, and between these and the criterion, or the unique relationships 
between one predictor and criterion.  It makes sense to look for a stable pattern across 
comparisons in deciding this issue.  If unique relationships between a given span task and 
gF are consistent across comparisons, it might suggest something interesting going on.  If 
the unique portions of variance explained by a given span task were changeable across 
comparisons, it would be like chasing a ghost to interpret the unique variance associated 
with that task.  Whatever is most stable across comparisons should be interpreted.   
In the case where predictors are significantly inter-correlated and significantly 
correlated with criterion variables, it makes more sense to focus on the variance shared 
among all the tasks, since this will be likely to reflect common underlying processes.  
Occasions of unique prediction by one or other task could be due to any number of 
reasons meaningful, statistical, or accidental, and unless a stable pattern emerges they 
should be given less interpretive weight than the shared predictive variance.  
The remaining text is organized as follows.  I describe the method of the 
experiment, then report and discuss individual differences results at a macro level.  
Specifically, I assess global indices of memory span as predictors of individual 
differences in gF.  After showing that each of the span measures has good predictive 
validity, I show that this result is mostly due to variance shared among the present span 
tests. I conclude that a shared WMC construct supports performance across the various 
span tests.  Next, analyses on a more micro level are reported.  Specifically, I examine 
effects on memory performance of the experimental variables list-length and rate of 
presentation in the simple and running span tests, and list-length in the complex span 
tests.   
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The point of the task-level analyses is mainly to support or provide information 
concerning the individual differences findings.  Examining the effects of list-length and 
other task variables can provide information concerning underlying processes that might 
or might not be at work across the span tasks.  The results will show that the tasks 
“worked as expected” given available knowledge concerning serial order memory tasks 
and the effects of rate, number of to-be-remembered items, number of presented items, or 
interleaved secondary task.  I finish by examining list-length effects on prediction of gF 
in the manner of Unsworth and Engle (2006a).  The final section of this paper discusses 







 Ninety-four participants between the ages of 18 and 35 years of age (mean  = 
23.57, SD = 4.38) were recruited from the Atlanta community and were individually 
tested in a sound-attenuated booth after informed consent was obtained, in exchange for 
financial compensation.    
Apparatus and Materials 
All tests were programmed in E-prime experimental software (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) and presented on a personal computer.  In the memory 
span tasks participants viewed sequences of black capital letters (F,H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, R, 
S, T, or Y) presented one at a time in 28 point bold Arial font in the center of the screen 
against a gray background. 
Procedure 
In Session 1, participants performed two complex span tasks (Operation and 
Reading Span), as well as a set of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, 
& Court, 1998).   Each of the complex span tasks is a storage-and-processing dual-task 
procedure requiring mental operations interleaved with item encoding and recall.  In 
Operation Span, participants solved simple math equations interleaved with the 
presentation of individual letters for later recall.  After 3- 7 trials (randomly determined) 
a cue prompted participants to report in serial order the letters they had been shown.  
There were three trials for each list-length.  Participants responded by clicking on the 
cells of a 4 x 3 grid displaying the twelve letters of the pool of items from which to-be-
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remembered items were sampled across trials (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 
2005).  Participants were instructed to click a ‘Blank’ button for any items they could not 
remember, and to click ‘Clear’ if they wanted to begin over their response sequence.  
Participants clicked a ‘Next’ button to end the response period and proceed to the next 
trial.  Reading Span was identical to Operation Span, except that concurrently with 
remembering letters, participants read sentences and indicated whether or not they made 
sense instead of solving math equations.  In scoring the span tasks one point was given 
for each item correctly selected in correct serial order, regardless of whether or not the 
entire set was perfectly recalled (Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm, & Engle, 
2005).   
The set of Raven’s Matrices in the present study consisted of twelve spatial 
reasoning problems.  Each problem presented a rectangular matrix of geometric figures 
with a missing element.  Participants selected from an array of choices at the bottom of 
the screen the figure that would complete the overall pattern of the matrix.  Participants 
had five minutes to complete as many problems out of twelve as they were able and one 
point was assigned to each correct answer.  Task order in Session 1 was the same for all 
participants:  Operation Span, Reading Span, and Raven’s.  Session 1 lasted 
approximately one hour.  
 Participants returned to the lab on a separate day for Session 2, during which they 
performed fast and slow simple and running spans to test WMC, and Shipley’s 
Abstraction Series to test gF.  In Session 2 all participants first performed the two simple 
span tests, then Shipley’s Abstractions, followed by the two running span tests.  The rate 
order was counterbalanced across participants, such that half performed tasks the faster 
span test first, followed by the slower one (separately for simple and running span tests).  
The other participants were given the span tests in the reverse rate order.  Participants 
were assigned to one of these two conditions in the counterbalanced order in which they 
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arrived for testing.  Session 2 lasted for approximately one hour.  In Session 1 and 
Session 2, participants worked without an experimenter present in the testing booth and 
were monitored for compliance by means of a closed-circuit camera system. 
Session 2 tasks are described next in the general order in which they were 
administered.  The simple span tests used the same pool of twelve letters as the complex 
span tests in Session 1 and the response format was also identical. Participants saw lists 
of 3- 9 items to be reported in the same order in which they were shown.  There were 
three trials for each list-length. Letters appeared on the screen for 300 ms in both fast and 
slow versions.  Stimuli followed each other by 200 ms in the faster one and 1700 ms in 
the slower one, yielding a rate of presentation of approximately two letters per second in 
the former test and one letter per two seconds in the latter.  Scoring was identical to that 
for the complex span tests. 
Shipley Abstractions Series consisted of twenty incomplete alphanumeric series 
presented individually on the screen one after the other.  Participants were required to 
type in the letter(s), number(s), or word that would complete the series.  For example, if 
shown “mist-is  wasp-as  pint-in  tone-_ _” the correct answer would be “on.”  
Participants had five minutes to complete as many problems as they were able and one 
point was assigned for each correct answer.   
The running span tests were closely matched in procedure and materials to the 
simple and complex span tests.  The same pool of 12 letters was used and the response 
format was identical.  Participants were required to recall the most recent 3- 8 letters 
during one block of trials each, in random order.  If the number of to-be-remembered 
items equaled n, the number of presented items equaled n + 0, n + 1, n + 2, and n + 3, in 
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random order.  The lists were blocked by recall series and participants were informed at 
the start of a block of trials how many items from the end of a list they would need to 
remember.  Within a block, participants saw three lists in which the number of to-be-
remembered items equaled the number of presented items (n + 0), and one list each where 
they differed by one item (n + 1), by two items (n + 2), and by three items (n + 3).  The 
preponderance of n + 0 trials (‘catch’ trials) was motivated by the wish to strongly 
discourage participants from ignoring the first item or two from each list.  Technically, 
the maximum score in each of the running span tests was 198.  In the multiple 
correlation/regression analyses, I restricted the running span data to include trials where 
the number of to-be-remembered items < the number of presented items.   
At the start of each block of trials, a screen instructed the participant how many of 
the last letters they should try to remember for that block.  This screen remained visible 
until the participant clicked the mouse to proceed to viewing the letter strings.  
Participants were given no instructions whatsoever about adopting an active or passive 
strategy, just as in the complex and simple span tests.  Rate of presentation was 
manipulated in the same manner as in the simple span tests.  Participants responded just 
as in the complex and simple span tests, i.e., by selecting items from a grid that presented 
all the possible letters that could appear on a trial.  Participants were informed again on 
the response screen how many of the last letters they should try to report in correct order.  








 Multiple regression/correlation results are reported in this section.  Results show 
that all of the tests were significantly inter-correlated, and that a stable proportion of 
variance in gF was predicted by variance that shared among the span measures.  More 
detailed task-level analyses, e.g., the effects on performance due to varying the number of 
to-be-remembered items, number of shown items, rate of presentation, etc., are reported 
afterwards.  Effects on prediction of gF by list length in the span tasks are also examined. 
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations  
 Running span trials in which the number of to-be-remembered items = the number 
of presented items, i.e., so-called ‘catch trials’ or whole recall trials, are formally similar 
to simple span trials.  Therefore the analyses reported here exclude such running span 
data in order to limit multicollinearity with other tests.  This means that multiple 
regression/correlation results reported in this section reflect performance on running span 
trials where the number of to-be-remembered items < the number of presented items, i.e., 
so-called ‘update trials’.  This selection of data has the benefit of isolating the task 
variable that most distinguishes running span from complex or simple span tests.  The 
excluded data are recovered in later sections reporting more detailed micro-level results. 
 Zero-order correlations among the tests are presented in Table 1, below.  Means 
and standard deviations are reported in Table 2.  The running span scores reflect three 
trials each of trying to remember 3- 8 letters in order, and simple span scores three trials 
attempting to remember 3 – 9 letters in order.  The complex span results reflect memory 
performance on three trials at list-lengths 3-7. Cronbach’s alpha estimates of internal 
consistency are reported on the diagonal of the correlation matrix.  Reliabilities are all 
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adequate to excellent and inter-correlations among all the tests are all significant at p < 
.001.  These results establish the existence of strong relationships among all of the span 
tests and the gF tests.  The following section further examines specific components of 
variance in gF that can be accounted for by the different span tests, individually and in 
combinations. 
 
Table 1.  Zero-order correlations among tests of immediate memory span and gF  (N = 
94).  Raven = Raven’s Matrices; Ship = Shipley Abstraction Series; Run 500  and Run 
2000 = Running Span at presentation rate of one item per 500 ms and 2000 ms, 
respectively; O Span = Operation Span; R Span = Reading Span; Simp 500 and Simp 
2000 = Simple Span at presentation rate of one item per 500 ms and 2000 ms, 
respectively.  Cronbach’s alpha estimates of reliability are on the diagonal.  All entries 
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Table 2.  Means, standard deviations and ranges.  In the span tests one point was assigned 
for each item correctly recalled in correct serial position.  Running span scores reflect 
only trials where number of to-be-remembered items < number of presented items.  In the 




 Mean (SD) Range 
Raven 7.8404 (2.2012) 10 (2 – 12), max 12 
Ship 14.1383 (3.05717) 18 (2 – 20), max 20 
Run 500 33.8404 (16.8901) 79 (1 – 80), max 99 
Run 2000 43.7979 (18.89733) 88 (4 – 92), max 99 
O Span 52.7340 (17.07931) 71 (4 – 75), max 75 
R Span 48.7128 (17.85523) 73 (2 – 75), max 75 
Simple 500 81.500 (16.39483) 76 (46 – 122), max 126 
Simple 2000 90.8723 (17.73899) 100 (22 – 122), max 126 
 
Multiple regressions (variance partitioning) 
 The high inter-correlations shown in Table 1 justify forming composite variables 
in the following analyses.  Using regressions to analyze criterion variance accounted for 
after controlling inter-correlation among predictors was described in detail in Chuah and 
Maybery (1999) and was also used by Cowan et al. (2005) in a study that included both 
running and complex span test data.  A Venn diagram can be used to represent the shared 













Figure 1.  Illustration of variance partitioning using three predictors.  The circles 
represent the predictor variables.  Adding the numbers in the sections will give the total 
amount of criterion variance accounted for (R2).  The numbers that would be entered in 
the non-overlapping sections represent the proportion of variance accounted for by 
shared relationships between or among predictors, and numbers in non-overlapping 
sections give the proportion of variance accounted for by variance unique to respective 
predictors. 
 
First I made a criterion variable, gF, by averaging z-scores on Raven’s Matrices and 
Shipley’s Abstractions.  Then I made composite predictor variables by similarly 
averaging z-scores on the two complex, simple, and running span tests.  Because all inter-
correlations were significant, there is no point in reporting significance tests for each of 
the following sets of regressions.  The reader can safely trust that the following sets of 
regressions all accounted for significant variance in the criterion.  Thus, in the following 
analyses I focus on the questions of how much variance in gF is explained, how much is 
Total R2 = .??? 










due to variance shared among predictors, and how much is due to unique relationships 
between predictors and criterion.  Predictors that accounted for significant variance due 
to unique relationships with the criterion are indicated in Figure 2.     
All the span tests together explained about 42.6% of variance in higher-order 
cognition.  Variance partitioning results are presented in Figure 2, Panel A, below.  These 
results indicate that roughly half of the predicted variance was due to shared relationships 
among the span tests (accounting for 20.4% of criterion variance).  The running span tests 
accounted for the largest portion of variance due to unique relationships with the criterion 
(accounting for 10.6% of criterion variance).  The simple and complex span composites 
made basically zero unique prediction, deriving their predictive utility in this set of 
regressions from variance shared with the running span tests.  Running and simple span 
tests also shared a discernible portion of predictive variance (accounting for 8.5% of 
criterion variance).  This is somewhat noteworthy because, as described earlier, the 
present data excluded the whole recall running span trials (where, like simple or complex 
span trials, the number of to-be-remembered items equaled the number of presented 
items).   
Decomposing these predictors into their constituent tasks, thus examining them 
pair-wise, yielded consistent results.  In each case, about half of criterion variance 
explained was due to shared relationships between span tests.  Panel B of Figure 2 shows 
that roughly 41.4% of variance in gF was accounted for by the two running span tests 
together, and a full three-fourths of this result was due to variance shared between the 
predictors (accounting for 31.2% of criterion variance).  Neither the fast nor the slow 
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running span contributed more than a small in comparison with the shared portion 
(explaining 6.8% and 3.4%, respectively).   
Panel C of Figure 2 shows that roughly 35.5% of variance in gF was accounted 
for by the two simple span tests together, and about half of this result was due to variance 
shared between the predictors (accounting for 16.1% of criterion variance).  Here the 
slower span test made the larger unique contribution, slightly larger in amount to the 
shared portion (accounting for 19.3% of criterion variance), while the faster simple span 
test made basically zero unique prediction.  Panel D of Figure 2 shows the results using 
Operation and Reading Span as predictors.  The two complex span tests together 
accounted for roughly 27.1% of variance in gF, about half of this due to shared 
relationships between them (accounting for 15.7% of criterion variance).  Reading Span 
made the larger unique contribution in this case (accounting for 11.4% of criterion 























Figure 2.  Partitioning gF variance according to shared and unique contributions among 
predictors.  (*) denotes significant unique prediction at p < .05. 
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Interim summary  
The preceding results indicate that each of the tests of immediate memory span 
used in the study reliably predicted individual differences in higher-order cognition.  
When span tests were used in different combinations, at least half of variance explained 
was reliably due to variance shared among predictors.  The consistency of this result 
underlies my claim that the three types of span tests measure the same underlying 
working memory capacity, in spite of wide procedural differences.  The differential 
unique prediction by one or the other span test in certain cases should be weighed 
somewhat lightly against this consistent shared portion, at least until a consistent pattern 
emerges.   
The results present rather strong evidence against the notion that complex span 
tasks of the processing and storage type, i.e., with an interleaved secondary task, are 
uniquely valid or inherently superior measures of working memory capacity.  In the 
present study, two kinds of serial order memory test, each lacking a secondary task, 
proved to be as highly correlated with gF as the complex span tests.  Both simple and 
running span tests, due to variance shared between them, accounted for criterion variance 
over and above that explained by variance they shared with complex span tests.  With 
respect to the running span vis-à-vis the other span tasks, variance unique to the effect of 
presenting more items than were to-be-remembered appeared to predict criterion variance 
over and above that explained by shared relationships with the whole recall tasks, 
complex and simple spans.    
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The finding that fast and slow running span accounted for much the same 
variance in higher-order cognition is not consistent with the idea that active updating 
processes were driving mean performance differences shown between fast and slow 
running span.  Presenting items at a rate of two per second would seem to preclude 
effective updating during list presentation, while presenting items at a rate of one every 
two seconds would seem to fully support updating if participants were to avail 
themselves of this strategy.  One would expect that a drastically different use of strategies 
across two tasks would lead to drastically different relationships with gF, yet 75% of the 
variance in gF explained by fast and slow running spans was due to variance shared 
between them.   
The finding that fast and slow running span accounted for much the same 
variance in higher-order cognition is not consistent with the idea that rehearsal-based 
processes were driving the mean performance differences between fast and slow running 
span.  Presenting items at a rate of two per second would seem to preclude effective 
maintenance-type rehearsal, while presenting items at a rate of one every two seconds 
would seem to fully support rehearsal if participants were to avail themselves of this 
strategy.  Yet it has been argued that increased use by participants of simple strategies 
like rehearsal will generally decrease correlations of a task with measures of higher-order 
cognition, and some evidence has been shown to that effect (Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 
1992).  Again, drastic differences in strategy across two tasks should result in different 
relationships with gF, yet 75% of the variance in gF explained by fast and slow running 
spans was due to variance shared between them.  By this same argument, the finding that 
the slow and fast simple spans shared approximately half of their predictive variance, and 
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that the slower simple span was if anything more correlated with gF than was the fast 
simple span conflicts with the idea that maintenance-type rehearsal was driving the 
performance advantage in the slow versus fast simple spans.   
List-length effects on memory performance  
 
 I examined list-lengths 3-8 for the simple and running span tests, and list-lengths 
3- 7 for the complex span tests in repeated-measures ANOVAs to assess effects of 
experimental variables on proportion correct recall.  Results are summarized in Tables 
A1, A2, and A3, in the Appendix.  The ANOVA results confirm that proportion correctly 
recalled from each list was strongly affected by experimental variables such as number of 
to-be-remembered items, number of presented items, or rate of presentation.  Due to the 
number of tasks included, for pictorial clarity I represent recall functions distributed 
across Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 shows functions for the two complex span tests and the 
two simple span tests.  The running span data are presented together in Figure 4.  There is 
a separate line for each trial type, i.e., n + 0, n + 1, n + 2, and n + 3 lists.  Altogether, the 
present data show an especially thorough sampling of the space of memory performance. 
 Figure 3 shows that simple span memory was higher than complex span memory 
across list-lengths (i.e., number of to-be-remembered items).  Memory for items in simple 
and complex span memory was similarly affected by increasing numbers of to-be-
remembered items, showing about a 10% increase in forgetting for each additional item.  
Rate interacted with number of to-be-be-remembered items in the simple span tasks such 
that decrements in memory due to the, relative to the slow, rate of presentation were most 
evident for list-lengths greater than five to-be-remembered items.  The equivalent 
performance between fast and slow simple spans for list-lengths less than about five 
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items, together with somewhat diverging performance for longer list lengths suggests that 
rate of presentation does not have much effect within the range of primary memory 
capacity, but is more influential on memory for lists long enough to require retrieval from 
secondary memory.  These results indicate that if rehearsal-based processes were 
important for the mean performance advantage for the slow versus the fast simple span, 
these rehearsal processes were selectively effective at differentiating performance when 
the number of to-be-remembered items was greater than about five items.  Note that the 
sizes of the rate effect and its interaction with list-length are relatively small in 
comparison with the main effect of increasing number of to-be-remembered items (Table 
A1). 
 Figure 4 shows that increasing number of to-be-remembered items also had a 
large effect on memory in the running span tasks.  The functions for fast and slow 
running span trials, where the number of presented items equaled the number of 
presented items, i.e., whole recall or catch trials, are comparable in slope and height to 
each other, and in slope with the functions for the other span tasks.  The basic list-length 
effects of greater forgetting with increasing number of to-be-remembered items appear to 
be similar in size across span tasks (Table A2 and Table A3).  The running span trials 
where the number of to-be-remembered items was less than the number of presented 
items, i.e., partial recall or update trials, show the exposure effect and interactions with 
rate and with number of to-be-remembered items.    The main effect of exposure was 
nonlinear: A greater increase in forgetting occurred for n + 1 trials relative to n +0 trials, 
than occurred for n + 2 relative to n + 1 trials, or for n + 3 relative to n +2 trials.  The 
exposure effect was greater when the rate was fast relative to when the rate was slow.  
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The effect of increasing number of to-be-remembered items interacted with the effect of 
increasing number of presented items.  Greater forgetting occurred due to presenting 
more items than were to-be-remembered, for longer relative to shorter to-be-remembered 
series.   
Rate did not interact with the effect of increasing number of to-be-remembered 
items like in the small interaction shown in the simple span data, but did interact with the 
effect of showing more items than were to-be-remembered.  This indicates that if 
rehearsal-based processes were important for the mean performance advantage for the 
slow versus fast running spans, these rehearsal processes were selectively effective at 
differentiating performance when more items were presented than were to-be-
remembered.  Note that like for the simple span data, the main effect of rate was smaller 
in comparison to the other main effects on running memory span, and the interactions 
involving rate produced very small effects indeed.  Note also that the effect of rate in the 
simple span data is comparable in size to the effect of secondary task in the complex span 






Figure 3.  List length effects on memory in simple span (2000 ms), simple span (500 ms), 




































Figure 4. List length effects on memory in two running span tests (2000 ms; = solid lines; 
500 ms = dashed lines).  Separate functions for n + 0, n + 1, n + 2, and n + 3 trial types 
are shown.  Error bars depict within-subject 95% confidence intervals.   




































List-length effects on prediction of higher-order cognition 
Unsworth and Engle (2007a; 2006a) demonstrated that correlations between 
simple memory span and gF increased with increasing number of to-be-remembered 
items, but found no such effect for complex memory span.  I expected to replicate their 
positive finding for simple span lists and the null finding for complex span lists.  Z-score 
averages of trials at each list length made up the predictor variables (separately for 
complex and simple span lists). A test of heterogeneity among correlated correlations 
(Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992) was not significant for the simple span lists, χ2 (4) = 
1.5878, p > .05, indicating that in the present sample, remembering a string of three items 
in correct order was just as predictive of higher-order cognition as remembering seven 
items in order was.  This outcome raises some questions about details of Unsworth’s and 
Engle’s (2007ab; 2006ab) account of processes underlying performance in complex and 
simple span tasks, insofar as their account is based on their positive finding in this regard.  
I did however, “replicate” their null finding with respect to complex span lists, χ2 (4) = 
1.877, p > .05.  These results are plotted in Figure 5, below. 
 37
 
List length effects on prediction by complex 























Figure 5.  List length effects on prediction by complex and simple span trials.  All 
correlations (and inter-correlations) are significant at p < .001 
 
Before extending this sort of analysis to the running span data, consider that the 
concept of “list-length” in running span trials is fractionated: The number of to-be-
remembered items is not identical the number of presented items.   Would these 
conceptually distinct variables show differences in predicting higher-order cognition?  I 
chose to address this question by comparing data from trials that could be matched to 
another trial in terms of either the number of to-be-remembered items or the number of 
presented items.  For example on trials represented as 3 (4) on the horizontal axis in 
Figure 6, participants had to remember three items but were exposed to four.  On trials 
represented as 4(4), participants were exposed to the same number of items as in the 3(4) 
trials, but were required to remember one more.  On 4(5) trials, participants tried to 
remember the same number of items as in the 4(4) trials, but were exposed to one more, 
etc.  Z-score averages of all the running span trials at each list-length (separating number 
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of to-be-remembered items from number of shown items) formed the composite predictor 
variables.  The resulting “saw-tooth” function showed significant heterogeneity among 



















Figure 6.  List length effects on prediction by running span trials.  All correlations (and 
inter-correlations) are significant at p < .001. 
 
 
  The function suggests that remembering three or four items when four or five, 
respectively, were shown, was more strongly associated with gF than was remembering 
three or four items when three or four, respectively, were shown.  A single contrast 
pitting correlations at 3(4) and 4(5) against 3(3) and 4(4) confirmed this impression, z = 
2.6525, p <  .01, 95% CI for the difference  = .4849 + .3583.  The function suggests a 
predictive gain for partial recall trials relative to whole recall trials, when the number of 
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to-be-remembered items is around or below the limits of “span”, i.e., within postulated 
capacity limits of a primary memory or focus of attention (Cowan, 2001; 4 items + 1).    
The above pattern of differential prediction reversed when target lists exceeded 
“span.”  A single contrast pitting correlations at 6(6) and 7(7) against 6(7) and 7(8) was 
significant, z = 2.1148, p < .05, 95% CI for the difference = .3866 + .3858.  Note that the 
running span tests here included three times as many whole recall as partial recall 
observations, and the confidence interval just barely excludes zero.  The shape of the 
function for “supra-span” lists might reflect differences in reliability of measurement, but 
this argument would seem to work against obtaining the “sub-span” result.   
It is possible that the boost in prediction for partial recall, sub-span, running span 
resulted from participants dropping from ceiling performance at those points.  This 
suggestion would have to also apply to the simple span data however, where at least 
equivalent ceiling performance was achieved for the shortest lists, yet the ascending 
function of correlations between simple span list-lengths and gF was not found in the 
present study, in a failure to replicate Unsworth and Engle’s (2006) results.   
It should be emphasized that all of the points in Figures 5 and 6 represent 
significant inter-correlations and correlations with gF at p < .001.  Consistent with my 
approach to interpreting the macro-level correlations, overall the analyses of correlations 
at the list-length level suggest most strongly that the same basic dimensions of working 
memory capacity are equivalently tapped into, no matter how many items are to-be-




A wide range of performance was sampled by the several span tasks in the present 
study.  Main effects and interactions produced an orderly family of recall functions.  
Performance was affected in predictable ways by presenting items at different rates, 
increasing the number of to-be-remembered items, increasing the number of items shown 
in excess of the number to-be-remembered, or requiring participants to perform an 
attention-demanding secondary task in between to-be-remembered items.  The wide 
intra-individual variation in performance across task variables is notable in light of the 
macro-level results indicating that the tasks accounted for much the same inter-individual 
variation in gF.  These findings overall suggest that much the same underlying working 
memory construct is tapped by the widely different serial order memory tasks in the 
present study. 
The correlation between gF and complex span did not vary as a function of 
number of to-be-remembered items, consistent with Unsworth’s and Engle’s (2006a) 
demonstration.  But neither did the correlation between gF and simple span performance, 
an outcome that is not consistent with their results.  In the present data, remembering a 
simple string of three items in correct order was just as strongly predictive of higher-
order cognition as was remembering a string of seven items in correct order.  It should be 
noted that the apparent discrepancy across studies could be due to the fact that the 
response format of the present simple span task was not paper-and-pencil, like those in 
Unsworth’s and Engle’s (2007a; 200a) analyses.  Even if serial order scoring is applied, 
paper-and-pencil formats cannot control the order in which people write down their 
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responses.  For all span tasks in the present study, response order was constrained to 
begin with the first target item and proceed in serial order to the last.     
The correlation between gF and running span (unlike complex or simple span) 
varied as a function of to-be-remembered items, but in a joint relation with the number of 
presented items.  Partial recall trials seemed to be more highly correlated with gF than 
were whole recall trials, when the number of to-be-remembered items was less or equal 
to about 4 + items.  Whole recall trials seemed to be more highly correlated with gF than 
were partial recall trials when the number of to-be-remembered items was > about 4 + 1 
items.  Note that just like for simple span, remembering a string of three items in correct 
items in order was significantly correlated with gF.  But there was an apparent boost in 







 The present study addressed a few different issues.  First in light of recent 
publications and re-analyses, I sought to demonstrate again whether complex and simple 
span tasks, as measures of working memory capacity, account for much the same 
individual differences in higher-order cognition.  They did.  When memory is the 
dependent measure, there is little additional benefit to prediction of individual differences 
in gF by interleaving secondary tasks between to-be-remembered items.  If it were true 
that complex span tasks tap into executive functions or a dynamic storage-and-processing 
ability in addition to basic serial order memory ability, one would expect these additional 
processes to be reflected in unique relationships with higher-order cognition.  Such 
unique relationships between complex span performance and gF were definitely not 
shown in the present results.  Both of the other kinds of span test explained more variance 
in gF than the complex span tests did.   
 Note that while the running span, like complex span, has been labeled an 
executive function task, the simple span test has not been so labeled.  If anything, simple 
span has been argued to tap into a passive storage buffer with little direct connection to 
cognitive control systems.  Yet the simple span tests outperformed the complex span tests 
at predicting higher-order cognition in the present sample (in fact, particularly so when 
presentation rate was slow enough to allow rehearsal).  These findings suggest that it 
might be good for working memory researchers to look at what is basically common to 
span tasks, e.g., serial order memory, rather than become absorbed by what may 
ultimately be minor differences among them.    
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 Second I extended this approach to include a different serial order memory task, 
running memory span, and evaluate this task against the others as a measure of working 
memory capacity that predicts individual differences in higher-order cognition.  This 
project was highly successful.  The running span tasks in the present study accounted for 
about 41.4% of the variance in gF.  The running span tasks shared about half of their 
predictive variance with the complex and simple span tasks, strongly indicating that 
fundamentally common underlying memory abilities are tapped by all three kinds of span 
task. 
 Third I looked at list length effects on memory performance and its prediction of 
gF in the three kinds of span task.  These too were most consistent with the idea that 
fundamentally common dimensions of working memory capacity are involved in 
performing all the tasks.  In spite of wide variation in performance due to task variables 
such as the number of to-be-remembered items, the rank ordering of individuals remained 
consistent across those variables.  There were orderly decrements in memory 
performance for each additional to-be-remembered item, but this did not translate into 
differential prediction by list length in any clear way.  Remembering a simple string of 
three letters (without interference from a secondary task) was just as highly correlated 
with gF as performance in many of the more complicated situations sampled in the 
present design.  This suggests that the same basic dimensions of working memory 
capacity required to remember a short list of three items are required to remember 1) the 
longer lists in simple span tasks, and 2) the items in complex and running span tasks, 
short or long lists.  This also suggests that these same basic dimensions of working 
memory capacity are important for higher-order cognition.     
 Fourth I looked at rate of presentation in the running span tasks, both in terms of 
memory performance and prediction of higher-order cognition.  This was stimulated in 
part by a split in the literature using the running span task, i.e., updating versus focus of 
attention.  In the present study, items in the running and simple span tasks were presented 
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at a rate of two per second or one every two seconds.  The faster rate was supposed to be 
fast enough to preclude either effective maintenance-type rehearsal or active concurrent 
updating strategies.  The slower rate was supposed to be slow enough to fully support 
such strategies if participants chose to avail themselves of them.  Even though the faster 
rate resulted in more forgetting in the running span task, the fast and slow tasks 
accounted for basically identical individual differences in higher-order cognition.  This is 
not what would be expected if participants spontaneously engaged in an active updating 
strategy as envisaged by those accepting the executive function account of running 
memory span, i.e., deleting old items, appending new items, re-ordering items, etc., 
concurrently with list presentation.  Instead these results are consistent with the idea that 
much the same encoding and retrieval processes are at work across serial memory tasks at 
various rates of presentation.   
 Participants may be induced by experimenter instructions to rehearse items in 
changing groups of three, four, etc. items in order to mimic a kind of active updating of 
the target set, as in Hockey (1973) and some more recent studies (Friedman et al, 2006; in 
press; Miyake et al., 2000).  It might be informative if data from such shadowing 
performance were actually reported (or recorded) for studies in which participants are 
instructed to rehearse/update in such a manner.  The extent to which shadowing errors 
correspond to subsequent recall is potentially informative.  Note that rehearsal in running 
memory span, of pre-target items that are ultimately not to-be-remembered, is likely to be 
detrimental to overall performance, because this would elevate the probability of 
incorrectly recalling items that had appeared prior to the target items.  Furthermore, I 
suggest that the active strategy instructions procedure is somewhat artificial as an 
operational definition of whatever working memory updating must be really like, 
although such interventions can lead to potentially useful data about grouping effects in 
immediate memory (as in the early experimental work with the running memory task, 
e.g., Hockey, 1973; Pollack, Johnson, & Knaff, 1959). 
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 The problem of updating in memory in general was introduced (Bjork, 1978) in 
terms of changing relatively stable representations such as the name of one’s current 
wife, where you parked the car today, etc.  It seems to me that the postulated executive 
function of working memory updating is not so much wrong as it is redundant with the 
transient nature of working memory representations as they are already universally 
conceived.  It seems that the notion of working memory updating has been somewhat 
more usefully approached through specifying biological mechanisms that could serve as 
gates controlling what currently active information is kept the same and what is changed, 
dynamically in response to changing environments and goals (e.g., Hazy, Frank, and 
O’Reilly, 2006).  This non-homuncular kind of updating could take place within-lists in 
lag tasks like running memory span or n-back, but also across lists in more conventional 
simple or complex span tasks.  It might also be supposed that the information needed to 
perform the secondary task in complex spans must be discarded just like previous-list 
items, consistent with the idea that working memory processes, such as updating, must 
operate generally across a wide variety of situations.  Working memory tasks cannot be 
neatly classified as ‘updating’ or ‘not updating’ tasks.  Updating in a very general sense 
must occur after each list, working against the effects of proactive interference, in any 
memory task with repeated trials with a limited pool of items.  Running span trials cannot 
be neatly classified as ‘update’ and ‘non-update’ trials, as suggested by the executive 
updating account.  This view is based in part on my consistent finding in the present 
study of substantial predictive variance shared among all the span tasks, whether or not 
they included special procedures designed to elicit updating, storage-and-processing, or 
passive maintenance.    
 I argue that people will use whatever is available at encoding and retrieval in 
order to remember events from the recent past.  Stuff that might be available to help 
remember would include person variables like internally generated retrieval cues or 
strategies.  Other available supports for memory would include environmental variables 
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pertaining to the encoding, such as features and contexts defining events when they 
occur, or external retrieval cues when they are to-be-remembered.  Given that early-
presented items in running memory span sometimes are and sometimes are not part of the 
set of to-be-remembered items, an optimal strategy might indeed be to encode all 
incoming items rather indifferently with respect to whether or not they are to be included 
in the target set, and to make this discrimination at time of retrieval.   
 The same basic information needed to perform the running span task in this 
‘passive encoding’ manner would be available under either fast or slow task conditions.  
Many forms of additional information could be available at time of test under slow 
conditions due to additional encoding, consolidation, or re-coding processes.  Features of 
memory representations might be relatively harder to discriminate under rapid versus 
slow presentation schedules.  Still, while there are innumerable conceivable sources for 
the advantage for memory performance in the slow running span task relative to the fast 
one, such processes did not result in the two tasks accounting for much different variance 
in gF (quite the contrary).  Thus I suggest that processes/representations available in 
either fast or slow presentation conditions were primarily driving performance and 
prediction of higher-order cognition, not processes hypothesized to be available in slow 
but not in fast presentation conditions.   
 Finally on the topic of rate and memory, consider that rate is only relatively fast or 
slow in any situation.  Human memory must accommodate the fact that events occur in 
the world at a wide variety of rates, relative to the observer, in limitless combinations 
along the continuum from fast to slow.  While there may be specialized processes or 
systems that come into play when dealing with special aspects of such fast-slow 
information, at some point accurate memory depends on the integration, or common 
scaling of such information.   
 My remarks have led me again and again to conclude that fundamental 
commonalities among the span tasks in the present study were the decisive influences on 
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memory performance as well as prediction of individual differences in higher-order 
cognition.  After a thorough consideration of the ways in which the tasks differ, let us 
consider at last what it is they have most in common.  The fact that all the memory tests 
used in the present study are serial order memory tasks is so basic that it almost escapes 
notice, and its importance has been possibly under-rated.  Consider that in many 
situations, remembering when events occurred can be as crucial as remembering what 
events occurred (e.g., remembering whether one has turned the ignition, then put the car 
into gear, before pressing the gas).  Many goal-directed activities require that actions be 
performed in sequences that are constrained somehow.  It would be a good use for a 
memory if it contained records of what actions had been already performed, and in what 
order, what occurred next, and so on.  This is plausibly the case when one is trying to 
solve inductive or sequential reasoning puzzles like Raven’s Matrices or Shipley’s 
Abstractions. 
 In keeping with my interest in memory processes that might possess generality 
across laboratory paradigms, I do not suggest that serial order tasks uniquely tap into 
order information or temporal organization in memory, although they were explicitly 
considered as such by Mukunda and Hall (1992).  I do suggest however that they can 
function like a microscope lens of a particular magnification aimed at such phenomena.  
Such glimpses provided by serial order span tasks into how memory records and supplies 
information about the temporal order of events can be usefully combined with other 
research paradigms that offer a view at a different magnification. 
  
Limitations 
 My conclusions are limited to the specific task parameters of the several span 
tests.  Only two rates of presentation were employed, and these were not all that far apart 
depending on the frame of reference (two items per second versus one item every two 
seconds).  My results could depend in some way on the choice of rates.  My results 
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cannot be generalized to running memory span tests given in the auditory modality either.  
The present study represents the first part of an extended parametric manipulation of the 
running memory span task that will include a wider sampling of rates (one item per 250 
ms, one per 1000 ms, and one per 2500 ms) and modalities (auditory and visual).  Our 
conclusions are limited to the two specific measures of higher-order cognition used in the 
present work.  It is likely that a wider sampling of intelligence or behavioral tasks in 




Table A1.  Summary of results from repeated-measures ANOVA on proportion correct 
recall across running span task conditions.  Rate = effect of 500 ms vs 2000 ms between 
items.  Recall = effect of the number of to-be-remembered items.  Exposure = effect of 




Source df MS 
F 
p partial eta 
squared 
Rate 
1 9.915 96.747 < .001 .513 
Error 92 .102    
Recall 5 32.212 305.109 < .001 .768 
Error 460 .106    
Exposure 3 20.995 221.289 < .001 .706 
Error 276 .095    
Rate by Recall 5 .114 1.850 = .102 .020 
Error 460 .062    
Rate by Exposure 3 .262 3.521 = .016 .037 
Error 276 .074    
Recall by 
Exposure 
15 .228 3.200 < .001 .034 
Error 1380 .071    
Rate by Recall by 
Exposure 
15 .073 1.373 = .152 .015 
Error 1380 .053    
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Table A2.  Summary of repeated measures ANOVAs on proportion correct across simple 
span task conditions.  Rate = effect of 500 ms vs 2000 ms between items.  Recall = effect 
of the number of to-be-remembered items.     
 
 
Source df MS 
F 
p partial eta 
squared 
Rate 
1 .752 21.065 < .001 .186 
Error 92 .036    
Recall 
5 5.940 257.741 < .001 .737 
Error 460 .023    
Rate by 
Recall 
5 .117 8.723 < .001 .087 




Table A3.  Summary of repeated measures ANOVAs on proportion correct across 
complex span task conditions.  2nd Task represents the difference between Operation and 
Reading Span tasks. 
 
 
Source df MS 
F 
p partial eta 
squared 
2nd Task 
1 .653 13.908 < .001 .130 
Error 93 .047    
Recall 
4 3.244 103.984 < .001 .528 
Error 372 .031    
2nd Task by 
Recall 
4 .045 1.855 = .118 .020 





Ackerman, P. L., Beier, M. E., & Boyle, M. O. (2005).  Working memory and 
intelligence: The same or different constructs?  Psychological Bulletin, 131, 30 – 
60. 
   
Anderson, J. R. (1974).  Retrieval of propositional information from long-term memory.  
Cognitive Psychology, 3, 288 – 318. 
 
Baddeley, A.D. & Hitch, G.J. (1974).  Working memory.  In G.H. Bower (Ed.),  The 
psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 8, pp. 47 – 89).  New York:  
Academic Press.  
 
Bjork, R. A. (1978). The updating of human memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The 
psychology of learning and motivation. (Vol. 12., pp. 235-259). New York: 
Academic Press. 
 
Bunting, M., Cowan, N., & Saults, J.S. (2006).  How does running memory span work?  
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59, 1691 – 1700. 
 
Cantor, J. & Engle, R. W. (1993).  Working memory capacity as long-term memory 
activation: An individual differences approach.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Leaning Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1101 – 1114. 
 
Chen, T., & Li, D. (2007).  The roles of working memory updating and processing speed 
in mediating age-related differences in fluid intelligence.  Aging, 
Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 14, 631 – 646.  
 
Chuah, Y.M.L., & Maybery, M.Y. (1999).  Verbal and spatial short-term memory: 
Common sources of developmental change?.  Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 73, 7 – 44. 
 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S.G., & Aiken, L.S. (2003).  Applied multiple 
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences.  Malwah, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
 
Colom, R., Rebollo, I., Abad, F.J., & Shih, P.C. (2006).  Complex span tasks, simple 
span tasks, and cognitive abilities: A reanalysis of key studies.  Memory & 
Cognition, 34, 158 – 17.    
  
Conway, A.R.A., Kane, M.J., Bunting, M.F., Hambrick, D.Z., Wilhelm, O., & Engle, 
R.W. (2005).  Working memory span tasks: A methodological review and user’s 
guide.  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 769 – 786. 
 52
Cowan, N. (2001).  The magical number 4 in short-term memory:  A reconsideration of 
mental storage capacity.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87 – 185. 
 
Cowan, N., Elliott, E.M., Saults, J.S., Morey, C.C., Mattox, S., Hismjatullina, A., & 
Conway, A.R.A. (2005).  On the capacity of attention:  Its estimation and its role 
in working memory and cognitive aptitudes.  Cognitive Psychology, 51, 42 – 100. 
 
Daneman, M. & Carpenter, P.A. (1980).  Individual differences in working memory and 
reading.  Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 19, 459 – 466. 
 
Engle, R.W. (2002).  Working memory capacity as executive attention.  Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 19 – 23. 
 
Engle, R.W., Cantor, J., & Carullo, J. (1992).  Individual differences in working memory 
and comprehension: A test of four hypotheses.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 972 – 992. 
 
Engle, R.W., Tuholski, S.W., Laughlin, J.E., & Conway, A.R.A. (1999).  Working 
memory, short-term memory, and general fluid intelligence: A latent-variable 
approach.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 309 – 311. 
 
Fisk, J.E. & Sharp, C.A. (2004).  Age-related impairment in executive functioning:  
Updating, inhibition, shifting, and access.  Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Psychology, 7, 874 – 890. 
 
Friedman, N.P., Miyake, A., Corley, R.P., Young, S. E., Defries, J.C., & Hewitt, J.K. 
(2006).  Not all executive functions are related to intelligence.  Psychological 
Science, 17, 172 – 179. 
 
Friedman, N.P., Miyake, A., Young, S.E., DeFries, J.C., Corley, R.P. & Hewitt, J.K. (in 
press).  Individual differences in executive functions are almost entirely genetic in 
origin.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 
  
Hallett, P. E. (1978).  Primary and secondary saccades to goals defined by instructions.  
Vision Research, 18, 1279 – 1296. 
 
Hazy, T.E., Frank, M.J. & O'Reilly, R.C. (2006). Banishing the homunculus: Making 
working memory work. Neuroscience, 139, 105--118. 
 
Hockey, R. (1973).  Rate of presentation in running memory and direct manipulation of 
input-processing strategies, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 25, 
104 – 111.  
 
Gates, A.I. (1916).  The mnemonic span for visual and auditory digits.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 1, 393 – 403.  
 53
Kane, M. J., Bleckley, M. K., Conway, A. R. A., & Engle, R. W. (2001).  A controlled-
attention view of working memory capacity.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 130, 169 – 183. 
 
Kane, M.J. and Engle, R.W. (2000).  Working-memory capacity, proactive interference, 
and divided attention: Limits on long-term memory retrieval.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 336 – 358. 
 
Kane, M. J. & Engle, R. W. (2003).  Working memory capacity and the control of 
attention: The contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and task set to 
Stroop interference.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 47 – 70. 
 
Kane, M.J., Hambrick, D.Z., Tuholski, S.W., Wilhelm, O., Payne, T.W., & Engle, R.W. 
(2004).  The generality of working memory capacity: A latent variable approach 
to verbal and visuospatial memory span and reasoning.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 133, 189 – 217. 
 
LaPointe, L.B. & Engle, R.W. (1990).  Simple and complex word spans as measures of 
working memory capacity.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 16, 1118 – 1133. 
 
Lehto, J. (1996).  Are executive function tests dependent on working memory capacity?.  
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A, 29 – 50. 
 
Meng, X., Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D.B. (1992).  Comparing correlated correlation 
coefficients.  Psychological Bulletin, 111, 172 – 175. 
 
Miyake, A. Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M.J., Witzki, A., Howerter, A., & Wager, T.D. 
(2000).  The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to 
complex “frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis.  Cognitive Psychology, 
41, 49 – 100.   
 
Morris, N. & Jones, D. (1990).  Memory updating in working memory:  The Role of the 
central executive.  British Journal of Psychology, 81, 111 – 121. 
 
Mukunda, K, & Hall, V.C. (1992).  Does memory for order correlate with performance 
on standardized measures of ability? A meat-analysis.  Intelligence, 16, 81 – 97. 
   
Pollack, I., Johnson, L.B., & Knaff, P.R. (1959).  Running memory span.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 57, 137 – 146. 
 
Postle, B.R. (2003).  Context in verbal short-term memory.  Memory & Cognition, 31, 
1198 – 1207. 
 
Raven, J.C., Raven, J.E., & Court, J.H. (1998).  Progressive Matrices.  Oxford, England:  
Oxford Psychologists Press. 
 54
Rosen, V. M. & Engle, R. W. (1998).  Working memory capacity and suppression.  
Journal of Memory and Language, 39, 418 – 436. 
 
Rosen, V. M. & Engle, R. W. (1997).  The role of working memory capacity in retrieval.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126, 211 – 227. 
 
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002).  E-prime user’s guide.  Pittsburgh:  
Psychology Software Tools Inc. 
 
Stroop, J. R. (1935).  Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 121, 15-23. 
 
Turner, M.L. & Engle, R.W. (1989).  Is working memory task-dependent? Journal of 
Memory and Language, 28 127 – 154. 
 
Unsworth, N. (2007).  Individual differences in working memory capacity and episodic 
retrieval: Examining the dynamics of delayed and continuous distractor free 
recall.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
33, 1020 – 1034. 
    
Unsworth, N. & Engle, R.W. (2006a).  Simple and complex memory spans and their 
relation to fluid abilities:  Evidence from list-length effects.  Journal of Memory 
and Language, 54, 68 – 80. 
 
Unsworth, N. & Engle, R.W. (2006b).  A temporal-contextual retrieval account of 
complex span:  An analysis of errors.  Journal of Memory and Language, 54, 346 
– 362. 
 
Unsworth, N. & Engle, R.W. (2007a).  The nature of individual differences in working 
memory capacity:  Active maintenance in primary memory and controlled search 
from secondary memory.  Psychological Review, 114, 104 – 132. 
 
Unsworth, N. & Engle, R.W. (2007b).  On the division of short-term and working 
memory: An examination of simple and complex span and their relation to higher 
order abilities.  Psychological Bulletin, 133, 1038 – 1066. 
  
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R.P., Schrock, J.C., and Engle, R.W. (2005).  An automated version 
of the operation span task.  Behavior Research Methods, 37, 498 – 505. 
 
Van der Linden, M., Brédart, S., & Beerten, A. (1994).  Age-related differences in 
updating working memory.  British Journal of Psychology, 85, 145 – 152. 
 
Waugh, N. (1960).  Serial position and the memory- span.  American Journal of 
Psychology, 73, 68 – 79.  
 
 55
Zachary, R. A. (1986). Shipley Institute of Living Scale: Revised manual. Los Angeles: 
Western Psychological Services. 
 
